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Governance, Coordination and Evaluation:  
the case for an epistemological focus and a return to C.E. Lindblom1 
 





1 This article has been shaped by discussions with numerous colleagues over several years. While there are too 
many names to mention, I would particularly like to acknowledge the comments and suggestions of Gerd Lintz, 
Tom Mills and Graham Smith, as well as the extremely helpful and supportive comments of the journal editors 




While much political science research focuses on conceptualizing and analyzing various 
forms of governance, there remains a need to develop frameworks and criteria for 
governance evaluation (Torfing et al 2012). The post-positivist turn, influential in recent 
governance theory, emphasizes the complexity, uncertainty and the contested normative 
dimensions of policy analysis. Yet a central evaluative question still arises concerning the 
capacity of governance networks to facilitate ‘coordination’. The classic contributions of 
Charles Lindblom, although pre-dating the contemporary governance literature, can enable 
further elaboration of and engagement with this question. Lindblom’s conceptualisation of 
coordination challenges in the face of complexity shares with post-positivism a recognition 
of the inevitably contested nature of policy goals. Yet Lindblom suggests a closer focus on 
the complex, dynamically evolving, broadly ‘economic’ choices and trade-offs involved in 
defining and delivery policy for enabling these goals to be achieved and the significant 
epistemological challenges that they raise for policy-makers. This focus can complement 
and enrich both post-positivist scholarship and the process and incentives-orientated 
approaches which predominate in contemporary political science research on coordination in 
governance. This is briefly illustrated through a short case study evaluating governance for 








At the heart of contemporary understandings of ‘governance,’ a term widely used in 
academic and political discourses with various meanings and purposes, is an emphasis 
on a shift from traditional, hierarchical government towards increasingly close, often blurred 
inter-relationships between public, private and non-governmental sectors, often discussed in 
terms of networks (van Kersbergen and van Waarden 2004). Different proposals for 
governance tend to share as starting premises the complexity and inter-connectedness of 
policy challenges. The involvement of a broad range of actors in governance is suggested 
either implicitly or explicitly to offer a more robust way of tackling complex challenges than 
hierarchical ‘government.’ Yet the focus of political scientists has tended to be on analyzing 
and conceptualizing governance rather than evaluating governance through consideration of 
outcomes. Reflecting the influence of ‘post-positivism,’ much recent scholarship highlights 
the plurality of contested values and understandings in terms of which governance might be 
evaluated. However, authors from a broadly post-positivist perspective have emphasized the 
need and potential to develop theoretical and methodological approaches for evaluating 
governance (Torfing et al. 2012). 
 
Addressing this need, this paper draws from the classic work of the political scientist 
Charles Lindblom. Lindblom’s work on policy-making pre-dates contemporary governance 
scholarship, in the context of which his dualistic distinction between government and market 
might seem rather anachronistic. Yet his emphasis on the potential for political science to 
engage more closely with evaluative questions about policy-making (Lindblom 1990, 270-
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276), it is argued here, has vital contemporary relevance. Lindblom does not see it as the 
role of social scientists to provide complete solutions to policy problems (ibid). He 
anticipates the later post-positivist turn in emphasizing the contestability of the norms and 
understandings upon which policy evaluation is necessarily based. His conception of 
coordination challenges incorporates such post-positivist sensitivity, while, it is argued here, 
offering a suitable focus for engaging with evaluative questions about contemporary 
governance. This focus concerns the epistemological challenges for policy makers of 
discovering and acquiring knowledge about potential decision impacts in the context of 
complexity. This epistemological focus can complement and enrich post-positivist 
scholarship, as well as other established political science approaches to analyzing 
governance arrangements which tend to focus on how they shape actors’ incentives to 
deliver policy goals. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces different proposals for 
‘governance’ before considering the tendency amongst both positivist and post-positivist 
political science traditions to refrain from evaluating such different forms of governance. 
Yet, it is shown, contemporary discussions of governance suggest the significance of 
coordination challenges, the potential focus for evaluative research proposed here. Section 3 
analyzes Lindblom’s conception of coordination in the face of complexity. Section 4, 
drawing from key features of Lindblom’s contribution, introduces a potential evaluative 
approach. Section 5 explains the potential application of this approach to contemporary 





2. Evaluating governance 
 
2.1 Proposals for governance 
 
In contrast with the traditional focus of policy analysis on single policy problems, 
‘governance’ is concerned with systems and processes through which multiple, inter-related 
policy areas are addressed. The various understandings of the term, employed in a range of 
international and national contexts, emphasize the inter-dependence of states on a range of 
private and non-governmental actors (van Kersbergen and van Waarden 2004). An initial 
use was the case for ‘good governance’ by international development agencies such as the 
World Bank, emphasizing the importance of strong political institutions and the rule of law 
to ensure that markets work. The term also arises in discussions about ‘global governance,’ 
through institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade 
Organisation and in debates about corporate governance, concerning the accountability and 
transparency of the firm.  
 
In terms of public policy and service delivery within nation states, a range of reforms from 
the 1980s onwards involving the adoption of private sector methods and practices, known as 
the ‘new public management,’ were heralded by some as a new form of governance. 
Influential in this respect was Osborne and Gaebler’s (1992) case for the state ‘steering’ 
public service delivery, promoting efficiency and innovation through more competitive 
arrangements such as outsourcing, quasi-markets and privatization. A further key feature of 
NPM is the introduction of performance measurement and targets for ensuring the 
accountability of the increasing range of service providers. NPM has since been widely 
criticized for promoting commercial and self-interest of service providers at the expense of a 
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public service ethos. Research in numerous policy areas shows how a focus on fulfilling 
narrowly defined targets can lead to unintended consequences. Bevan and Hood (2006), for 
example, explain how some ambulance depots in England relocated from rural to urban 
areas to ensure they achieved response time targets, even though this was harmful to rural 
services. The wide recognition of such potential for perverse incentives has led numerous 
academics and practitioners to emphasize the importance of fostering trust and mutual 
learning through governance networks achieving ‘collaboration’ and ‘partnership’ (Ansell 
and Gash 2008). Aside from, yet related to, these debates in public administration, there is 
an established literature on ‘new governance’ tools for delivering policy and services 
(Salamon and Elliott 2002). These are indirect mechanisms that tend to be market orientated 
and rely on third parties, including loan guarantees, insurance, voluntary standards, permit 
and voucher systems. 
 
2.2 Political science and evaluation 
 
As Bevir (2013) explains, key traditions in political science have informed these contrasting 
proposals for governance. Rational choice theory, with its assumptions, borrowed from 
positivist Neoclassical economics, of the rational, self-interested, utility-maximizing 
economic actor influenced the case for NPM. This influence was achieved by public choice 
theory in particular which applies rational choice assumptions to develop a critique of 
traditional, hierarchical state bureaucracies as failing to establish the appropriate incentives 
for serving the public interest (Niskanen 1994). Rational choice theory was borne out of the 
positivist tradition, which sees the role of social sciences as establishing value neutral 
‘scientific,’ analysis with predictive capacity. Yet, as subsequent debates about NPM make 
evident, rational choice assumptions have deeply normative implications for governance. As 
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the subsequent critique by ‘new institutionalists’ emphasizes, rational choice theorists 
overlook how economic behavior is rooted in socio-cultural norms and routines. This 
critique informed the strong subsequent challenge to NPM by advocates of ‘collaborative’ 
network governance (Bevir 2013).  
 
These contrasting political science traditions thus clearly have important normative 
implications concerning the desirability and effectiveness of different forms of governance. 
Yet the primary focus of political science as a discipline is to provide explanatory analysis 
rather than to directly address such evaluative questions. This is further evident in the ‘post-
positivist’ tradition, widely influential since the late 1980s in political science generally and 
policy analysis in particular. Post-positivists emphasize the contested nature of the values 
and knowledge that inevitably underpin analysis and evaluation (Hawkesworth 1988). A key 
focus has been their critique of positivist approaches to explanatory analysis of political 
institutions, which they argue neglect the vital significance of discourses in shaping 
institutions and policy agendas (Hajer 1993). Post-positivists have been critical of positivist 
policy evaluation methods such as cost-benefit analysis which attempt to quantify risks, 
costs and efficiency, concepts which are inevitably based on normative assumptions and 
subject to multiple contested interpretations (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1994). Yet, aside from 
these critiques, there is significant scope for this tradition to engage more directly with 
evaluative questions about governance and policy. An early paper by John Dryzek, 
emphasized the need to establish a philosophical middle ground between positivism and the 
“abyss” of relativism (Dryzek 1982, 322). In a similar vein, Fischer (2009) more recently 
discusses how post-positivist scholarship can inform policy evaluation through a process of 
continually testing or “probing” policy actors’ factual claims, exploring the norms and 
contested assumptions that inevitably shape these understandings. Interestingly, this notion 
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of ‘probing’ truth claims in the context of complexity, uncertainty and contrasting normative 
perspectives can be traced back to Lindblom (1990). These contributions lay important 
philosophical foundations for post-positivist evaluation. Yet there is a need for post-
positivists to address methodological questions to enable the challenge of evaluating 
governance to be further addressed (Torfing 2007, 21). 
 
Post-positivism, with its emphasis on the importance of discourse and meaning in shaping 
institutions, can complement and deepen new institutionalist understandings of their socio-
cultural embeddedness (Schmidt 2012). In departing from rationalistic models, each 
tradition highlights important dimensions of complexity that require consideration in 
governance evaluation. Like new institutionalism, post-positivism has influenced 
scholarship on governance networks, as reflected in the strong emphasis on the uncertainty 
and normative contestation involved in complex governance and policy challenges  (Kickert, 
Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). Still, as recent reviews show, there 
have been few studies proposing and applying criteria for evaluating governance networks 
(Kenis and Provan 2009; Torfing et al. 2012). The more evaluative studies conducted so far 
reflect a positivist influence, tending to focus on rather narrow evaluative criteria such as 
cost efficiency or cost effectiveness. Further reflection upon the meaning of such evaluative 
criteria is needed (Torfing et al. 2012) and here there is scope to draw from post-positivist 
insights into the multiple understandings and norms underpinning the uses of such terms. 
Some scholars propose principles for governance, such as ‘reflectivity’ (Voss, Bauknecht, 
and Kemp 2006) or ‘interactive governance’ (Torfing et al. 2012) that incorporate sensitivity 
to the contestability of knowledge shaping policy analysis. Yet there remains need and scope 
to assess specific governance arrangements and tools for translating such principles into 
practice, through further interrogation of the meaning and implications of complexity. 
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2.3 Governance and coordination 
 
Although the primary focus of the networks literature is not to directly assess their 
effectiveness, suggestions are made concerning their potential superiority as a form of 
governance. In light of the number of actors involved in networks and the inter-connected 
nature of policy challenges, some scholars in this field whose work is broadly post-positivist, 
suggest that networks are a potential “coordination mechanism” (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004, 
79; 107; 154) and can enable “integration” (Kooiman, 2003: 203). The potential role of 
state actors in enabling coordination within networks, articulated in various ways, are the 
subject of ongoing discussion. For example, Kickert (1995) introduces the notion of the state 
‘steering at a distance’, while Rhodes (1996) suggests the ‘self-organizing’ capacity of 
networks. These conjectures reflect what Pressman and Wildavsky (1973, 133) describe as 
the almost universal agreement on the desirability of ‘better coordination.’ Coordination is 
generally understood by political scientists as a type of process for attaining ends. A key 
reason for the general normative appeal of the concept is that it is not, in itself, concerned 
with the particular content of these ends. The term could thus be applied across a range of 
social contexts characterized by varying pluralities of values and interests. Yet, in spite of 
this broad appeal of the concept, Lindblom’s observation that clear, more specific 
definitions of coordination are “elusive” (Lindblom 1965, 22) remains pertinent (Peters 






3. Lindblom on coordination and complexity 
 
Lindblom’s work develops an alternative to rationalistic understandings of policy-making in 
which the challenge of achieving coordination is a central theme throughout (Lindblom 
1959, 85; 1965; 1979, 523; 1993, 67-68). His early work famously introduces 
‘incrementalism’, an understanding of policy-making as an ongoing process of incremental 
policy adjustments in the face of complexity (Lindblom 1959). Not least due to some 
ambiguity in his use of the term, Lindblom’s discussion of ‘incrementalism’ led to 
considerable debate and disagreement (Gregory 1989). Some critics argued that the concept 
does not sufficiently accommodate the possibility of goal-orientated analysis of policy 
alternatives (Weiss and Woodhouse 1992).  In terms of understanding real world policy-
making, the approach was criticized for under-estimating the significance of unequal power 
relations between actors. Lindblom has been interpreted as shifting from a pluralist to a neo-
pluralist position in response to this criticism (Parsons 1996, 252-253), emphasizing the 
disproportionate influence of business interests in the policy process (Lindblom 1977; 
Lindblom and Woodhouse 1993). However, the primary point in Lindblom’s famous 1959 
paper, which he later described as uncontentious (Lindblom 1979, 524) is that rational, 
synoptic policy analysis is unachievable. In The Intelligence of Democracy he then focuses 
on exploring how political processes of negotiation and “partisan mutual adjustment” 
(PMA), drawing from the knowledge and insights of a plurality of actors, can achieve a kind 
of collective intelligence. This account, which Lindblom saw as the main novelty of his 
work (Lindblom 1979, 524) and is briefly summarized in Section 3.2, incorporates a 
significant critique of centralist forms of political organization. However, the key focus here, 
analyzed in Section 3.1, is Lindblom’s conceptualization of coordination in the face of 




3.1 Conceptualizing coordination and complexity 
 
Lindblom’s understanding of coordination differs markedly from previous instrumentalist 
treatments of the concept, reflecting the departure from positivism more broadly evident in 
his work. Some early scholarly work on coordination, assuming a hierarchical organization, 
interprets coordination in the instrumentalist, positivistic sense of translating into practice 
a given set of goals through rational selection of centrally known possible means. Examples 
can be found in a range of fields including inter-organizational studies (White 1974) and 
environmental policy integration (Underdal 1980). For Lindblom, this overlooks the 
epistemological challenges of acquiring knowledge about options and their impacts, in the 
context of complexity and indeed political contestation.  
 
Lindblom’s work more generally anticipates post-positivist philosophy of science in 
emphasizing how the complexities of policy problems inevitably give cause to qualify the 
knowledge that policy analysts are able to attain (Lindblom 1990). Given his primary 
focus on understanding and assessing policy-making processes, he does not give the same 
kind of detailed attention as interpretivist scholars to philosophical questions about the 
ontological status of the reality about which knowledge claims are made. It can be argued 
that, in contrast with interpretivists, Lindblom accepts the empiricist principle that there is a 
real world of which we can obtain at least imperfect knowledge (Hawkesworth 1988, 
23). It is beyond the scope of this article to consider any such philosophical differences in 
further detail. The point to emphasize here is that Lindblom’s treatment of coordination 
incorporates strong recognition of the contested nature of the goals and understandings 




This post-positivist starting point is only subtly evident in Lindblom’s definition of 
coordination: 
 
“A set of decisions is coordinated if adjustments have been made in it such that the adverse 
consequences of any one decision for other decisions in the set are to a degree and in some 
frequency avoided, reduced, counterbalanced, or outweighed” (Lindblom 1965, 154). 
 
This reference to adverse consequences being counteracted to “some degree,” is at least an 
implicit acknowledgement that, contrary to the implications of rationalist models, perfect, 
optimal coordination is unachievable. Lindblom’s departure from narrowly instrumentalist 
treatments of coordination becomes clearer in his distinction between coordination and 
consistency. In the context of a pluralistic society, he emphasizes, coordination should not 
be taken to mean that all decisions are consistent in the sense of placing the same degree of 
priority on a given set of values. After all, variation in how different decisions weight 
different values might better reflect the plurality of values held by individuals across 
society, particularly given the need for the remediation of previous decisions (Lindblom 
1965, 197).  
 
The distinctiveness of Lindblom’s treatment of coordination lies not so much in his formal 
definition but his further elaboration of the challenge of achieving coordination in the face of 
complexity. This is developed through a critique of influential rationalistic policy analysis 
models, which share key assumptions with Neoclassical economics. Coordination, he 
explains, cannot be conflated with efficiency in the Paretian sense of an outcome where it 
is impossible to make someone else better off without making someone else worse off. 
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There are, he points out, a range of possible Pareto efficient distributions of resources, 
including some highly unequal distributions. Neoclassical economists recognize that there 
are various ways to evaluate such distributions in terms of their utility for different 
individuals. However, given their view of economics as a positivist ‘science,’ these 
economists refrain from such value judgements. This, they stress would require 
interpersonal comparisons of utility and there can be no scientific basis for such 
comparisons. By contrast, Lindblom stresses the need to evaluate outcomes in terms of a 
broader range of welfare criteria than just Pareto efficiency  (Lindblom 1965, 227-228) . 
The equality of the distribution is one such key criterion emphasized by Lindblom, while 
others would include different social and environmental impacts. Lindblom emphasizes 
that such ends are qualitatively distinct, often incommensurable (Dahl and Lindblom 
1963, 40),  departing from the neoclassical assumption that all welfare impacts can be 
expressed in terms of a single, monetary or numerical unit of measurement. For Lindblom, 
there can be no purely rational approach to weighing these different ends. For such choices, 
between ends as he puts it, “reason exhausts itself” (Lindblom, 1965: 188). The need to 
take into account multiple criteria has been acknowledged in Neoclassical economics by 
the Kaldor-Hicks definition of efficiency, according to which those who would suffer the 
negative consequences of a decision in terms of one criterion, could in theory be 
compensated in terms of another. The principle has been famously applied in 
environmental economics to make the case for those gaining from an economic activity 
giving monetary compensation to those suffering from its negative environmental impacts. 
Lindblom’s approach is more in keeping with heterodox traditions, including Ecological 
Economics, which emphasize that proposals for such a compensation mechanism overlook 





Ultimately, Lindblom accepts, actors’ views about whether coordination has been achieved 
will hinge on their qualitatively distinct, incommensurable ‘ends.’ Hence there is, he 
acknowledges, an open-endedness to his formal definition of coordination (Lindblom 1965, 
154). Nonetheless, he shows that the concept offers significant scope for evaluating political 
processes, in terms ensuring that chosen means achieve the balance of ends being 
sought. Coordination, he emphasizes, is an ongoing process, in which complex, closely inter-
twined means- ends inter-relationships continually evolve. We cannot, he comments, 
precisely assign weightings to our ends defined in a general, abstract way, prior to this 
process, (Lindblom 1959, 81; Lindblom 1965, 146). Importantly, this implies that 
ideological debates involving abstractly defined goals, such as ‘equality’ or ‘ justice,’ not 
only leave unresolved but are also crucially shaped by ‘means related’ questions of how they 
translate into practice.  
 
Although Lindblom does not express the point in quite this way, complex means-ends inter-
relationships are ‘economic’ in a broad sense that recognizes our ends are not necessarily 
reducible to monetary measurement. In itself, Lindblom’s point about the inextricability of 
means-ends inter-relationships is well- recognized and was also made by some of his 
contemporaries (e.g. Wildavsky 1966, 299-300).  However, Lindblom especially strongly 
emphasizes the epistemological challenges involved in ensuring coordination between 
multiple decisions, given the difficulties of anticipating their impacts in the face of such 
economic complexity. Indeed, for Lindblom, coordination is synonymous with the 
avoidance of “adverse,” unintended consequences (Lindblom 1965, 150-151).  
 
This epistemological emphasis distinguishes Lindblom’s work from earlier classical 
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discussions of coordination as achieved through markets, notably from Bernard de 
Mandeville and Adam Smith. These two economists emphasized how markets generate 
incentives for individuals to engage in economic activities that satisfy the needs and 
preferences of others, hence facilitating coordination. By emphasizing how the 
discovery of means shapes the ends and hence the motives of actors, Lindblom’s 
work highlights the close inter-relationship between these epistemological and incentives 
dimensions of coordination challenges. As Lax and Sebenius (1986, 298-303) point 
out, ensuring that actors have the motivation and incentives to acquire and disclose 
information is vital for effective decision-making. Yet, the two dimensions are conceptually 
distinct. It is possible to imagine that a solution to a policy problem is known (hence there 
is no epistemological problem) and that the primary problem for governance is ensuring 
that actors are incentivized to put this solution into practice. Conversely, it is possible to 
imagine that actors are motivated to seek to coordinate their activities to promote the public 
interest and that the only obstacle to achieving effective governance is acquiring 
knowledge of the most effective policies and practices for achieving this. Hence it is 
possible to assess and compare the weight that scholars place on these two dimensions, as 
does Section 4.2 of this paper. 
 
There are parallels between Lindblom and Friedrich Hayek who also departs from a 
positivistic, rationalistic approach, emphasizing the epistemological dimension of 
the challenge of coordination. Hayek provides a conceptually rich account of how markets 
and the price mechanism generate and communicate knowledge about demand and supply 
for goods and services that would not be available in their absence (Hayek 1948). His 
famous skepticism about the capacity of political processes to achieve coordination, given 
the profound complexity of means-ends inter-relationships across society, resonates in 
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contemporary critiques of planned economies and the welfare state. In comparison with 
market processes, Hayek emphasizes, political decisions are inevitably more centralized, 
hence more susceptible to failing to capture knowledge required for translating policy 
goals into practice. 
 
Lindblom accepts the indispensability of the coordinative role of markets and the price 
mechanism (Dahl and Lindblom 1963, 173; Lindblom 1977, 68). He shares Hayek’s 
concern with the capacity of political processes to address the closely intertwined 
epistemological and incentives-related dimensions of coordination problems. Yet 
Lindblom (1977) balances this with more attention than Hayek to  the problems of 
markets such as the inequalities, externalities and inefficiencies they can generate. Unlike 
Hayek, he views political processes as offering significant potential for achieving 
coordination. Aside from these differences, their conceptualizations of coordination are 
similar in abstract terms, being distinguishable from any specific type of political or market 
process. Both imply that to assess whether a process has achieved coordination 
requires close attention to different actors’ substantive understandings of policy decisions 
and outcomes.  
 
In a commentary including a rare focus on Lindblom’s conceptualization of coordination, 
Ernest Alexander criticized Lindblom’s treatment of the concept as a purely abstract goal 
which “dilutes the concept to the point of making it almost “meaningless”. Lindblom’s 
definition is indeed very inclusive in terms of the kinds of institutions and processes that 
can potentially count as facilitating coordination, though this is deliberate (Lindblom 1965, 
154). As Alexander (1995, 4) acknowledges, this inclusivity can be seen as an advantage 





3.2 Processes for achieving coordination 
 
Although Lindblom does not seek to provide definitive answers about the effectiveness of 
specific institutional arrangements in achieving coordination, he takes a critical stance 
towards attempts at centralized coordination, or ‘synoptic planning’ (Lindblom 1965, 
173). He offers a detailed account of the potential for coordination through less 
hierarchical, more distributed PMA processes, which he suggests might be understood as a 
‘new’ form of planning (Dahl and Lindblom 1963, 20). This potential, he suggests, can 
be assessed in different political and policy contexts through empirical investigation 
(Lindblom 1965,  181). Lindblom’s account of how PMA might achieve coordination, 
even though the outcomes reached are not “reasoned” (Lindblom 1965, 184-185) is 
very briefly summarized here as a further elaboration of Lindblom’s epistemologically 
orientated conceptualization of coordination challenges. This account is notably 
somewhat analogous to the Hayekian account of market coordination through ongoing 
mutual adjustments (Meadowcroft  1999, 32).  
 
Lindblom views PMA bargaining processes, like markets, as enabling engagement with 
and reconciliation of conflicting values and trade-offs (Lindblom 1965, 227). PMA 
achieves this by capturing, communicating and bringing together knowledge and 
expertise that is dispersed across a range of actors (Lindblom 1965, 157;189), hence 
enabling learning. Policy-makers might not entirely “solve” problems but political 
processes, he suggests, are a way of “coping” (Lindblom 1965, 157) with complexity, 




150) of a decision. Lindblom gives a number of reasons why a decentralized, interest-
driven PMA process might be more effective in achieving coordination than a system of 
top-down, centralized control. A key argument he gives is that PMA involves negotiation 
between various interest groups serving as “watchdogs” for different value dimensions of a 
problem (Lindblom 1959, 85; Lindblom 1965, 156) and “compellingly call to others’ 
attention aspects of the problem they cannot themselves analyze” (Lindblom 1959, 151). 
The pluralistic character of PMA provides an opportunity and incentive for a wide range 
of actors with contrasting goals to become involved and shape outcomes (Lindblom 
1965, 208). Those values that are widely shared, he argues, will tend to carry more weight 
during the PMA process (Lindblom 1965, 75). Lindblom also stresses the potential for 
reaching agreement or compromise on decisions where participants are motivated by 
different values (Lindblom 1965, 208). Hence, processes of coordination, rather than being 






4. Drawing from Lindblom 
 
Assessing Lindblom’s conjectures about the coordinative potential of politics thus 
requires close consideration of how far and in what ways political processes, as viewed by 
the range of actors involved, capture and convey knowledge, values and interests relating 
to the assessment of decisions and their impacts, while fostering the appropriate incentives for 
policy delivery. As further explained below, such a focus can potentially complement and 
enrich established political science approaches to analyzing governance, including post-
positivist approaches. Given that coordination is a prominent theme in a range of social 
science literatures and that Lindblom’s work is widely known, one might have expected his 
discussion of the coordinative potential of politics to have inspired and influenced a whole 
tranche of further empirical studies. However, as further explained below, it is very 
questionable how far these literatures offer such direct, empirically-orientated investigation 
of Lindblom’s conjectures, for which there is significant need and potential.  
 
4.1 From processes to outcomes 
 
Coordination and related concepts are prominent in several literatures in political science, 
public administration and related fields such as organizational studies. These literatures tend 
to focus on analyzing and conceptualizing governance processes, rather than considering 
policy outcomes as Lindblom’s understanding of coordination suggests is required. This is 
reflected in the common focus upon the distinction between ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ 
coordination in political science scholarship on governance. Horizontal coordination refers 
to coherence between geographical or sectoral divisions of political authority. Hence the 
term can be applied to departmental or ministerial coordination (Krause 2009), sub-national 
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authorities (Hawkins and Andrew 2011) or across nation states (Kaiser and Prange 2004).  
Vertical coordination refers to coherence between decisions of a political authority and their 
implementation within their jurisdiction. Analyzing governance in these terms offers useful 
insights into coordination challenges within different spheres of governance. However, the 
focus is upon processes rather than outcomes. Krause, for example, assesses the degree to 
which vertical coordination is achieved by analyzing how far presidential goals are shared 
by subordinates. Metcalfe (1994) provides a typology of different degrees of horizontal 
coordination, defined in entirely procedural terms, ranging from where ministries take 
decisions independently to the establishment of central priorities and government strategies.  
 
Also reflecting this process orientation, Peters defines co-coordination failure as when the 
actions of two organizations entail one or more of the following:  
 
 Performance of the same task (redundancy);  
 No organization performs a necessary task (lacunae); 
 Policies with the same clients (including the entire society as the clients) have 
different goals and requirements (incoherence) (Peters 1998, 303).  
  
While referring to some key types of coordination problem, this typology alone is not 
sufficient as a set of criteria for evaluating governance and policy, nor is it intended to be 
such. As Peters acknowledges, phenomena such as redundancy, lacunae or incoherence are 
not necessarily undesirable. There can on some occasions be a strong normative case for 
redundancy, or even lacunae. Peters comments: “There may be some circumstances in 
which complexity and incoherent approaches are functional, rather than dysfunctional, for 




This process-orientated focus is reflected in various literatures on concepts closely related 
to coordination, notably ‘integration,’ ‘collaboration’ and holistic governance. A case in 
point is the burgeoning literature on Environmental Policy Integration which unfortunately, 
as two leading authors acknowledge, has “very little to say” regarding policy outcomes 
(Jordan and Lenschow 2010, 156). The same is true of the literature assessing attempts 
by central governments to achieve ‘joined up’ or ‘holistic’ governance, with the UK 
experience having been particularly extensively discussed. Here, analyses have focused on 
developing typologies of different procedural arrangements for achieving horizontal 
coordination or integration, such as shared budgets and performance targets (Ling 2002). 
The related literature on ‘collaborative’ governance (Ansell and Gash 2008) also has a 
process-orientated focus, developing more qualitative typologies of different degrees of 
collaboration. Although certain types of process might tend to promote better outcomes, this 
needs to be demonstrated, as Lindblom’s treatment of coordination highlights. 
 
4.2 From incentives to knowledge 
 
Reflecting the influence of dominant political science traditions, notably rational choice 
theory and various forms of new institutionalism, political science scholarship on 
coordination focuses primarily on analyzing incentives-related barriers to coordination (or 
related concepts such as ‘integration’ and ‘collaboration’) in a procedural sense. The 
epistemological dimension of coordination challenges highlighted by Lindblom is relatively 
overlooked. Oliver Williamson’s work, of key importance in the emergence of new 
institutionalism, focuses on evaluating governance arrangements through a focus on the 




monitoring task completion under alternative governance structures” (Williamson 1981, 
552). Transaction costs can clearly be an important influence upon the incentive structures 
under different governance arrangements, as shown further by authors such as Fritz Scharpf 
and Elinor Ostrom (Ostrom 2005; Scharpf 1997). However, as critics of transaction cost 
economics (TCE) have pointed out, there is also a need to consider the processes of learning 
and discovery that can arise from some transactions, which are overlooked by (TCE) but are 
of vital importance for evaluating organizational structures (Foss and Klein 2008, 425-442). 
Other forms of new institutionalism, which depart significantly from Williamsonian TCE, 
share this primary focus on incentives rather than knowledge. Cases in point are Scharpf and 
Ostrom, famous for their criticism of Williamson as overlooking how actors’ preferences are 
shaped by the social and cultural influences, hence cannot be treated as exogenous to the 
institutional context. These authors briefly acknowledge the significance of potential 
information problems for governance that Lindblom highlights, although their primary 
concern is the mutual compatibility of actors incentives and how to overcome competing 
interests (Scharpf 1997, 70). 
 
This focus on processes and incentives is similarly evident in the network governance 
literature. Allusions are made, albeit often only implicitly, to the potential for networks to 
address epistemological challenges. Kickert et al. (1997, 44) and Koppenjan and Klijn 
(2004, 165) comment on how solutions to policy problems can emerge through interactive 
negotiation processes. In places, distinctively epistemological reasons are given for this 
view. For example, Kooiman (2000: 142) makes a similar suggestion, commenting that: “No 
single actor, public or private, has the knowledge and information required to solve 
complex, dynamic, and diversified problems.” However, there is no direct, systematic 




Torfing et al (2012, 172), amongst the few to have proposed criteria for governance 
evaluation, do recognize the epistemological dimension of coordination challenges. Their 
suggested criteria include policy makers' understandings of problems and opportunities, the 
need for policy feasibility and flexibility, coordination of implementation and 
responsiveness to feedback and learning. Torfing et al leave open significant questions about 
how these criteria might be defined and operationalized. How, for example, might we assess 
whether governance actors achieve a “well informed understanding of the policy problems 
and policy opportunities at hand” or “smooth policy implementation based on continuous 
coordination and a high degree of legitimacy” (Torfing et al. 2012, 172)? Underlying these 
suggested criteria is the epistemological dimension of coordinative challenges articulated by 
Lindblom. This involves enabling the discovery and drawing together of knowledge 
dispersed across various actors and closely intertwined with policy actors’ incentives to act 
effectively on the basis of this knowledge. As further argued below, a systematic focus on 
assessing how governance processes address these challenges enables closer engagement 
with governance evaluation. 
 
4.3 Towards post-positivist evaluation 
 
While Lindblom emphasizes the contestability and variation of actors’ values, interests or 
‘ends,’ he also refers to the potential for a degree of overlap between them. Lindblom’s case 
for PMA processes concerns their potential for reaching policy decisions that reflect 
value weightings which a significant majority of people will at least come to accept, even 
when subject to significant initial conflict (Lindblom 1965, 205-245).2 Furthermore, as 
                                                            
2 This argument based on potential shared values becomes more explicit in Chapter 18 of Lindblom (1965) 
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Lindblom importantly points out, chosen policy means might gain support from a range of 
people with different ends (Lindblom 1965, 239-242). His later discussions of philosophy of 
science refer to the scope for such shared perspectives concerning the actual and potential 
impacts of policy decisions (Lindblom 1990). Hence, a degree of such overlap between 
stakeholders’ values, interests and knowledge can, for Lindblom, serve as a basis for 
evaluation. It follows that policy evaluation requires careful analysis of these different 
perspectives. In this respect, he further anticipates the approach of some leading post-
positivists, such as Dryzek and Fischer.3  
 
Evaluation in terms of coordination, as understood by Lindblom, requires establishing the 
extent of such overlap in perceptions of the actual and potential outcomes of multiple 
decisions. Well suited to this task is frame analysis, a post-positivist method for comparing 
stakeholder perspectives influential in policy analysis and some network governance 
research. Rein and Schon (1994, 146), pioneers of frame analysis as an interpretivist 
approach, define frames as “the process of selecting, organizing and interpreting and 
subsequently giving meaning to a complex reality to provide guideposts to knowing, 
analyzing, persuading and acting”. Hence comparison of framings, or ‘cross-frame’ 
analysis, involves analyzing the assumptions and norms underpinning actors’ views and 
perceptions, or ‘framings’, of policy problems (Laws and Rein 2003).  
 
As explained above, Lindblom emphasizes the importance of actors’ values and interests, or 
‘ends’ in shaping policy agendas, also a central theme in post-positivist scholarship on 
policy and governance. The danger highlighted by Lindblom of policy decisions 






post-positivist theme. Notably, amongst the numerous post-positivist studies comparing 
framings of policy problems and the values they reflect, many focus on comparing insights 
of ‘lay’ people with established ‘expert’ forms of knowledge. Here, the focus is especially 
on the domain of natural sciences, in relation to policy issues such as nuclear power and 
genetically modified foods (Bäckstrand 2003). Yet, technical and scientific questions 
concerning such technologies are often closely inter-twined with complex economic 
questions (Greenwood 2010), such as how far such technologies are necessary or cost 
effective, given the range of different technologies, resources and consumer demands in 
complex modern economies. Lindblom gives insights, pertinent to a range of contemporary 
governance contexts, into how the challenge of balancing and refining policy goals is shaped 
by such economic complexities and the epistemological challenge of anticipating decision 
impacts in this context. This contribution suggests the need for post-positivist policy 
evaluation to assess how far perceived adverse decision impacts might be unintended, 
reflecting what we might refer to as ‘epistemological gaps’ in policy-makers’ framings of a 
problem. While, as Lindblom argues, there are limits to how far we can rationally evaluate 
policy makers’ ends, there is greater scope for “probing” knowledge claims (Lindblom 
1990) concerning the effectiveness of selected policy means for achieving those ends.  
 
Where such analysis highlights an epistemological gap, this prompts the question of how far 
the gap reflects the particular institutional context for the decision, again a question of close 
interest to Lindblom as his case for PMA makes clear. Lindblom views epistemological gaps 
as to some extent inevitable, given the inherent complexity and associated uncertainty 
involved in policy-making. His concern is with the evaluative question of whether 
institutional arrangements ensure that such potential gaps and their possible adverse 
unintended consequences are at least minimized. It follows that the cross-frame analysis 
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proposed here should consider stakeholders’ framings not only of substantive policy 
problems but of the institutional arrangements that shape how policy actors respond to the 






5. Application of the approach 
 
Although Lindblom’s discussion of PMA focuses on decision-making by political leaders at 
a single scale, he notes that such a coordinative process could potentially involve a broader 
range of actors (Lindblom 1965, 10-11). Applying the type of cross-frame analysis proposed 
above to assess how epistemological and incentives-related challenges are addressed in 
contemporary governance systems requires analysis of an especially broad range of 
stakeholder framings, given that they tend to straddle multiple scales, sectors and 
organizations. Just as actors with different ends, as Lindblom points out, might agree upon a 
set of policy means as a compromise, so they might potentially support governance 
arrangements designed to accommodate a plurality of ends and policy means. Conversely, 
arrangements within a particular governance sphere might be criticized for having adverse, 
possibly unintended, consequences, giving rise to the need to further seek potential causes 
through cross-frame analysis of related governance spheres. The analysis will inevitably 
need to selectively focus upon a set of especially closely related governance spheres and 
policy tools, as illustrated in the case study below. 
 
Lindblom’s illustrative applications of his conceptualization of coordination concern the 
effectiveness of PMA processes, for example PMA within political parties (Lindblom 1965, 
311-329), without detailed consideration of their outcomes. The approach proposed here 
includes attention to both governance processes and outcomes, as explained below through a 
brief, illustrative case study conducted by this author (Greenwood 2012; Greenwood 2015). 
The focus is on the ambitious British government target set in 2006 that by 2016 all new 
homes in England should be ‘zero carbon’. The challenge of steering markets towards this 
target involves coordination problems in procedural terms, cutting across the jurisdiction of 
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multiple government departments, as well as in Lindblom’s substantive sense of balancing 
multiple objectives. As well as the mandatory building regulations and planning policy, a 
key tool in this agenda was the Code for Sustainable Homes, commissioned by Government 
and developed by a private firm BRE as a graded set of standards that could be adopted 
voluntarily by housing developers and set as requirements by various funders of social 
housing, from local authorities to national agencies. Such voluntary, or quasi-voluntary, 
standards, developed through private sector expertise, of which there are many in the UK 
construction sector, typify ‘new’ governance tools, widely viewed by environmental 
regulation scholars as vital to fostering innovation and learning (Gunningham, Grabosky, 
and Sinclair 1998). The governance arrangements for developing these policy tools included 
an integral role for industry. A notable example of Government adopting a ‘steering’ 
approach was their establishment in 2009 of the Zero Carbon Hub, an industry network 
organization commissioned to advise on and deliver the zero carbon target.  
 
A detailed cross frame analysis was conducted, incorporating a broad range of private, 
public and non-governmental sector stakeholders involved in defining and implementing 
this policy agenda, based on qualitative data from interviews and industry events. 
Broad support was found for the general ‘end’ of reducing CO2 emissions from new 
homes, including a significant, though varying degree of support amongst housing 
developers, in spite of the widely observed lobbying by many of them for a slowdown in the 
rate at which regulations for the energy efficiency of new homes were strengthened. 
Although conflicting interests are involved, stakeholder debates about this policy agenda are 
not reducible to interest and value-driven differences between stakeholders alone. Vital 
questions also arise, involving contrasting perspectives and knowledge, concerning the 
appropriate governance-related means for steering markets towards the ends of this policy 
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agenda, given demands to ensure economic feasibility while enabling innovation and 
sensitivity to local contexts for housing developments.  
 
Overall, this policy agenda is widely agreed to have fostered significant learning and 
innovation across housing and related industries. Amongst the significant achievements was 
the establishment of a minimum energy efficiency standard for the building fabric of new 
homes (FEES) that would form part of the 2016 target. FEES gained wide acceptance from a 
broad range of stakeholders. However, concerns were raised by many practitioners about 
various adverse unintended consequences of policy and standards, notably including the 
Code (Greenwood 2012). The Code’s points system for ranking homes in terms of six levels 
was argued to be creating numerous perverse incentives. Installations of various 
technologies were rewarded that would not necessarily bring environmental benefits, such as 
water recycling systems in areas of high rainfall and cycle storage or low carbon energy 
technologies that might never be used. Some adverse unintended consequences arose from 
inter-relationships between policy tools managed by different departments. For example, an 
adjustment to the methodology for calculating building energy efficiency (by Department 
for Energy and Climate Change) to make it easier for homes without a gas supply to achieve 
standards inadvertently made it easier for homes on the gas grid to achieve higher Code 
standards through installation of electric heating, which entailed higher CO2 emissions. 
(The Code was managed by Department of Communities and Local Government). 
Especially prominent concerns were expressed about the ‘zero carbon home’ definition itself 
which initially required that all energy used should be generated by renewables on the site of 
the home, such as solar panels or micro wind turbines on the roof. A range of stakeholders 
pointed out that such ‘100% on site’ was not feasible or cost-effective on some sites, 
particularly in urban areas. There were, they argued, other more cost effective options for 
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tackling emissions from the built environment, such as energy efficiency measures for 
existing homes and improving public transport. These criticisms of policy tools as 
incentivizing a ‘box ticking’ approach to satisfying performance measures, rather than 
assessing potential outcomes more holistically, are reminiscent of critiques of NPM. It was 
felt that the Code and associated zero carbon definition were promoting an unviable pathway 
for mainstream housing that would not fully ‘feed into’ mandatory regulations in the way 
initially envisaged by key policy-makers and advocates of such non-mandatory governance 
tools. Among those expressing these concerns about policy coordination were some 
designers and consultants with a strong normative commitment to achieving the ‘end’ of 
sustainable, low carbon homes.  
 
These perceived adverse consequences prompt the question of whether their causes can be 
traced to the governance processes through which these tools were developed. Here, we can 
usefully compare the processes for defining FEES and the Code. The proposed FEES was 
based on a recommendation by Zero Carbon Hub following extensive industry consultation. 
Being independent from government, the Hub incentivized stakeholders to reach agreement 
rather than concede the final decision to government. By contrast, decisions by numerous 
local authorities to set high Code levels as a planning condition did not always command 
such support. Questions were raised by designers and developers about whether local 
authorities had the required expertise and resources to set such targets appropriately. This in 
turn prompts questions about the national level process through which the Code was 
established. In 2009 the proposed ‘100% on site’ zero carbon definition was changed in 
response to the industry criticism that it was unviable. It was announced that financial 
contributions by developers to off-site renewables and other emission-saving measures 
would count towards achieving zero carbon. This suggested that policy-makers had initially 
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been unaware of the full implications of their first definition, hence that there was an 
epistemological gap in their framing. The future course of innovation in technologies such 
as on-site renewables inevitably involves significant uncertainty and complexity, hence such 
a gap is to some degree inevitable. Yet, institutional factors were also significant in this 
case. Some civil servants or ministers, it was suggested during interviews, might not have 
had sufficient time or the required specialist knowledge to fully understand or act upon 
criticisms from experts, including some closely involved in policy-making (Greenwood 
2012). This epistemological gap could have been exacerbated by state officials lacking 
sufficient resources or incentives to develop expertise, again illustrating the close inter-
relationships between epistemological and incentives dimensions of coordination challenges 
highlighted by Lindblom. Furthermore, concerns were raised that the arrangements for BRE 
to develop and maintain the Code entailed a lack of accountability and responsiveness. 
Analysis of the substantive outcomes of such ‘public-private’ governance arrangements, as 
outlined here, can complement and inform our understandings of how such governance 
arrangements potentially undermine accountability, a theme discussed so far primarily in 
process terms (see Willems and Van Dooren 2011). 
 
Compared with more general post-positivist analysis of policy discourse, such detailed 
analysis of coordination problems in the face of economic complexity, as well being vital for 
governance evaluation, enhances our understanding of the impacts of such discourse. For 
example, Barry and Paterson (2004), analyzing U.K. environmental policy under New 
Labour, highlight an ‘ecological modernization’ discourse that emphasized potential for 
environmentally sustainable economic growth. Yet, in this case of housing, support for 
ecological modernization was weakened by widely perceived problems with the tools 
developed for delivering the agenda, notably the Code. Consequently, it was easier for the 
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subsequent Coalition Government to justify its 2014 decision to wind down the Code. The 
prior ecological modernization became superseded in this case by a discourse of 
‘streamlining’ policy.  
 
As briefly illustrated in Section 2.1, such debates about governance effectiveness are ongoing 
in a range of contexts. Considerable resources are required for conducting the extensive, 
detailed, inter-temporal, qualitative, cross-frame analysis proposed here for political 
science to engage more closely with the evaluative dimension of these debates. 
As Lindblom (1965, 166) himself acknowledges, no evaluation can be comprehensive, or 
definitive and this is especially true in a governance context. Yet, the fundamental 
importance of coordination problems as defined here means that, where they occur, they 
are likely to be highlighted by actors when asked to evaluate the area of 
governance concerned, even if not necessarily articulated in terms of ‘coordination’. The 
impossibility of synoptic evaluation should not, as Lindblom argues, deter researchers from 







In contemporary political science, the question of the concepts and criteria to use in 
evaluating governance remains very much open, not least in light of post-positivists’ 
emphasis on the contestability of values that provide the basis for any evaluation. 
Lindblom’s conception of coordination in policy-making offers a potential focus for meeting 
this need, sharing these post-positivist premises and differing markedly from instrumentalist, 
narrowly economistic understandings of the concept. Assessing whether a policy process has 
achieved coordination, as understood by Lindblom, requires a focus on how far the various 
actors involved are enabled to discover and act upon knowledge concerning the possible 
means for addressing policy challenges. Lindblom’s work suggests that an especially close 
focus is needed on this ‘epistemological’ challenge in the context of complex, closely inter-
twined means-ends inter-relationships. Such an epistemological, outcome-orientated focus 
can complement analysis of the incentives of governance actors to address policy 
challenges, on which established political science approaches tend to focus. The approach 
proposed here can complement and enrich widely used post-positivist methods, ensuring 
that sensitivity to complexity enables rather than prevents closer engagement with vital 
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